The Debate Over War Powers by Shulman, Mark R.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-2003
The Debate Over War Powers
Mark R. Shulman
Pace Law School, mshulman@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shulman, Mark R., "The Debate Over War Powers" (2003). Pace Law Faculty Publications. Paper 320.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/320
he October 1 6, 2002, joint resolu- 
tion authorizing the use of U.S. 
armed forces against Iraq (House 
Joint Resolution 114) marks a turning 
point in the history of American war 
powers. For half a century, the executive 
branch has tried to establish an inde- 
pendent authority to bring the United 
States into war. Executives have relied 
on imperial notions of the presidency, 
sional authorization) when the necessity 
to act is "instant, overwhelming, and 
leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation." 
Responding to perceived trespasses 
by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and 
Richard Nixon in initiating and expand- 
ing the war in Southeast Asia, Congress 
clarified its sole authority to declare war 
determine the legal status of the con- 
flict. They posit that the president has 
the "inherent executive authority" to ini- 
tiate wars as commander in chief under 
Article 11, Section 2 and as part of the 
plenipotentiary power of the office. This 
argument, if accepted, would give the 
president virtually unlimited powers to 
use force-not only to repel sudden 
and e;pecially on their role as com-' 
mander in chief of the armed forces. To 
maintain its position against presidential 
usurpation, Congress has relied on the 
War Powers Clause of the Constitution 
and on the 1973 War Powers 
Resolution. Despite this historic tension, 
following a surprisingly mild political 
battle during the summer of 2002, the 
107th Congress preauthorized President 
George W. Bush to use armed force 
against Iraq, effectively ceding the power 
to declare war to the president--at least 
in this one case. And the National 
Security Strategy introduced in 
September 2002 implies that the presi- 
dent may well continue to pursue pre- 
emptive wars like the invasion of Iraq, 
practically guaranteeing that the nation 
will face similar questions in the near 
future. Because the president still does 
not acknowledge the constitutional limi- 
tations, and Congress has dodged the 
issue, at least about Iraq, it is important 
to recognize it and insist that the presi- 
dent must seek congressional approval 
for future preemptive invasions. 
War Powers 
The text is simple: pursuant to Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. 
Constitution, "The Congress shall have 
Power . . . To declare War." On this 
there is no question. The Founders' 
decision to use the word declare instead 
of make leaves the president limited and 
clearly delineated power to "repel sud- 
den attacks" against the United States. 
Under Daniel Webster's widely cited 
definition, such a defensive war is justi- 
fied (and presumably needs no congres- 
Human Rights 
in 1973. The War Powers Resolution 
(WPR) requires the president to report 
to, and regularly consult with, Congress 
after deploying armed forces to a com- 
bat zone. Unless Congress authorizes 
military action, the WPR requires the 
president to withdraw U.S. forces within 
sixty days of deployment. A congres- 
sional declaration of war or enabling 
resolution such as House joint 
Resolution 1 14 supercedes these 
requirements by authorizing the presi- 
dent to conduct war. 
Some argue that the WPR is ineffec- 
tive and unconstitutional because it seeks 
to alter the constitutional war powers 
framework, noting that no president has 
recognized the WPR's authority. In 
essence, the WPR serves merely to clarify 
and make effective Congress's constitu- 
tional war powers and reflects a political 
reality: in large-scale conflicts, presidents 
have consistently sought congressional 
authorization, for instance when 
President George H.W. Bush sought 
authorization for the Gulf War in 1991. 
Founders' intent 
Some writers, such as Assistant 
Attorney General John Yoo, would curb 
the authority expressly granted to 
Congress, arguing that the Founders 
reserved for the president the power to 
initiate wars and gave Congress the 
power merely to ratify them, i.e., to 
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attacks but also to launch offensive 
operations, for example, as part of the 
war against terrorism outlined by the 
National Security Strategy. According to 
this view, congressional authority has 
atrophied over time through acquies- 
cence to numerous presidential wars, 
for example, Kosovo. 
These arguments ignore or miscast 
the plain text of the Constitution granting 
Congress the sole authority to authorize 
war. Conversely, no text provides the 
president with the discretion to do so 
without congressional authorization, in 
the absence of a sudden and over- 
whelming threat to national security. 
War Powers Clause 
Advocates of unilateral executive 
authority also bring a so-called original- 
ist understanding to the War Powers 
Clause. They argue that the American 
concept of executive war powers was 
formed largely by the British experience, 
despite the historical fact that the 
colonies' revolt from Britain was partly a 
reaction to the Crown's excessive execu- 
tive power. In reality the president's role 
as commander in chief was intended to 
institutionalize civilian control over the 
military; absent an immediate threat, the 
president may only execute Congress's 
decision to initiate war. 
Those who broadly interpret the 
executive's war-making ability argue that 
Winter 200.3 
appropriations are a sufficient check- 
and the primary one intended by the 
Founders-against executive war pow- 
ers. Congress, they say, may simply 
refuse to fund further military operations. 
Under this theory, Congress may halt 
military actions once troops have been 
committed. In reality, such a check 
could well be meaningless: the action 
could be ended, damage done, and lives 
lost well before the withdrawal of fund- 
ing took effect. Moreover, such a plan 
could prove catastrophic if Congress 
withdrew funding after the president 
had committed a large ground force. 
Winter 2003 
Congress should not be in a position to 
decide merely how many casualties the 
United States will accept rather than 
whether to risk incurring losses in the 
first place. 
Security Council Resolutions. Some 
scholars focusing on international law, 
such as the eminent professor and judge 
Thomas Franck, propose that the presi- 
dent may undertake military action with- 
out congressional authorization if the 
UN Security Council had authorized the 
action. Under this view, Section 8, Article 
I, Clause 11 was intended to ensure that 
the decision to initiate war not rest with 
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one person. UN authorization avoids this 
problem, perhaps even more effectively 
than congressional authorization, 
because the Security Council "is far less 
likely to be stampeded by combat fever 
than is Congress." Thomas Franck & Faiza 
Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: 
"The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. 1. 
INT'L L. 63, 74 (1 991 ). As examples, pro- 
ponents of this view observe that U.S. 
forces have fought two wars pursuant to 
Security Council resolutions: the Korean 
War and the 1990-1 991 Gulf War. 
UN authorization does not absolve 
the president of a constitutional obliga- 
tion to obtain congressional authoriza- 
tion. Treaty obligations such as those 
under the UN Charter or the North 
Atlantic Treaty (forming NATO) are 
equivalent to federal statutory law and, 
as such, never trump the Constitution. 
See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW 3 1 11, cmt.(a). The exam- 
ples of the Korean and Gulf Wars are 
unpersuasive. President Harry S. Truman 
sent U.S. forces to Korea to repel a sud- 
den attack-the North Korean invasion 
had nearly overrun South Korea, threat- 
ening irreparable harm to U.S. security 
interests. As noted above, in case of 
sudden attacks on the United States or 
its vital interests (including those vital 
enough to be included in mutual 
defense treaties), the president has 
authority to wage war. Moreover, 
President Truman sought UN approval 
only as a fig leaf for acting without 
Congress; he had ordered the deploy- 
ment of American forces to South Korea 
before obtaining UN authorization and 
later commented that he would have 
ordered military intervention regardless 
of the Security Council's position. More 
recently, President George H.W. Bush, 
despite UN authorization, sought and 
received congressional approval for the 
Gulf War. Absent congressional 
approval, Security Council resolution 
alone has never sufficed for declaration 
of war. 
Large-Scale Invasion I s  War 
The administration started to build its 
case for invading Iraq shortly after 
September 1 1,2001. During the thirteen 
months between September 1 1 and the 
signing of House Joint Resolution 11 4, 
continued on page 22 
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The United States should adopt a 
policy of being a friend who shares its 
legendary resources and wealth with the 
800 million persons in the global village 
who are chronically malnourished. The 
nation needs a new foreign policy that 
lives up to the ideals of human rights 
proclaimed in the United Nations 
Charter. The United States and all of the 
190 nations of the earth pledged in 
Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter 
that they would help one another attain 
the newly recognized political and eco- 
nomic rights that now constitute the 
public morality of the world. This cannot 
be done so long as the United States 
relies almost exclusively on its military 
prowess for its foreign policy. Lawyers of 
America have to act as moral architects 
who will restrain the impetuous policies 
of the government that teach that vio- 
lence, armed conflict, and military 
might can solve the moral, spiritual, and 
human problems that overwhelm much 
of humanity. 
Robert F; Drinan, S.]., is a professor at 
Georgetown University Law Center in 
Washington, D.C., and a former member 
of the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Debate over 
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its arguments moved from the idea that 
lraq was somehow behind the terrorist 
attacks; to a declaration that Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea constituted an "Axis of 
Evil"; to a general justification based on 
Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion (WMD) and its animosity to the 
United States; and finally to a moral 
imperative. Only after the Security 
Council took up the debate did the 
administration take a position that lraq 
must be disarmed. Despite the shifting 
rationalizations, the administration's goal 
has remained the same: the United 
States will use all means necessary to 
depose Saddam Hussein. And yet, 
despite the obvious lack of an instant 
and overwhelming threat, the adminis- 
tration claimed for nearly a year that it 
did not need congressional authorization 
for such a war. Moreover, even as the 
president signed the Joint Resolution, his 
press secretary maintained that the 
authorization was unnecessary. 
Constitutionally, the president has 
the unilateral authority to commit U.S. 
troops to lraq or another rogue state 
under the newly promulgated preemp- 
tion policy of the National Security 
Strategy only if he can show that such 
an action constitutes response to a sud- 
den or imminent attack. The administra- 
tion has provided no evidence that lraq 
had invaded or intends to invade the 
United States (i.e., as a sponsor of 
September 1 I), let alone that it will do 
so imminently. Absent such evidence, 
congressional approval is needed. This 
conclusion is based upon the following 
three points: 
First, the scale of military action nec- 
essary to force a regime change in lraq 
(or any relatively stable state) strongly 
suggests the action would be a "war" as 
defined by the Constitution. In the most 
recent judicial opinion on the subject, 
Dellums v. Bush, a federal district court 
found "no hesitation in concluding that 
an offensive entry into lraq by several 
hundred thousand United States ser- 
vicemen . . . could be described as a 
'war' within the meaning of [the War 
Powers Clause]." Dellums v. Bush, 725 
F, Supp. 1 141 (D.D.C. 1 990). Congress 
would more likely acquiesce to unilat- 
eral executive decisions involving rela- 
tively small forces, but it cannot waive 
its constitutional war powers. 
Deployment of 200,000 or more 
troops (or, even a smaller force deploy- 
ment in conjunction with a massive 
aerial assault), as the Pentagon has 
proposed, i s  practically and qualitatively 
different from the scale of other recent 
U.S. military interventions, except for the 
Vietnam and Gulf Wars (for which the 
president specifically sought and 
received congressional authorization). 
Second, invading lraq to effect a 
regime change is clearly not an exam- 
ple of repelling a sudden or imminent 
attack. At least since 1993 when lraq 
may have attempted to assassinate for- 
mer President Bush, Saddam Hussein 
has neither used force against or direct- 
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ly threatened the United States or its 
vital interests (aside from attacks on 
allied aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones 
above Iraq). According to National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, any 
threat that lraq poses is not of an imme- 
diate nature; if it were, the president 
already would have acted. Thus, charac- 
terizing an invasion of lraq as repelling 
a sudden or imminent attack under 
these circumstances dangerously dis- 
torts the Founders' intent to limit the 
Executive's authority. 
Third, time limitations help to clarify 
the boundary between executive and 
legislative war powers with regard to 
repelling "sudden attack." The president 
has the authority and obligation to repel 
sudden attacks because there is no time 
to deliberate,'and an individual can act 
faster than Congress. A president who 
feared rejection of war plans might not 
want them subjected to congressional 
scrutiny, but that decision does not 
belong solely to the president. 
National Security Strategy 
The administration has made clear 
that lraq may not be its only target. On 
September 20, 2002, the president 
issued the National Security Strategy, 
which proclaims that in order to "fore- 
stall or prevent. . . hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary act preemptively. . . . [Iln an 
age where the enemies of civilization 
openly and actively seek the world's 
most destructive technologies, the 
United States cannot remain idle where 
dangers gather." 
Under the doctrine of preemption, 
the administration claims the right to 
launch wars to prevent harm to U.S. 
interests: in essence claiming the United 
States may decide unilaterally to pre- 
emptively invade another country. This 
policy applies not only to lraq but also 
to any state that helps put weapons of 
mass destruction in the hands of terror- 
ists. Indeed, in light of recent informa- 
tion about North Korea's nuclear 
weapons program, this could well be 
the next point on the Axis of Evil to face 
a preemptive war. 
Conclusion 
The issues kmain timely and rele- 
vant: must the president seek congres- 
sional authorization to order preemptive 
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invasions of rogue states that may deliver 
weapons and aid to terrorists? What is 
the correct scope and allocation of war 
powers for preemptive invasions? House 
joint Resolution 114 did not answer or 
reduce the urgency of these questions. 
Both history and the Constitution itself 
show that the president is not free to 
change the constitutionally mandated 
allocation of war powers. 
Mark R. Shulman is an associate at 
Debevoise & Plinlpton and a lecturer at 
Columbia University School of Law. 
Lawrence 1. Lee is a student at New York 
University School of Law. The authors 
acknowledge with gratitude the advice 
of Daniel Reich in writing this article. 
Omarska Camp, 
Bosnia 
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functioning more efficient or effective, 
or performing acts that advance the 
goals of the criminal enterprise. 
Persecution and Sexual Violence 
Notably, the Chamber also stressed 
that any who knowingly participate in a 
significant way in a criminal enterprise 
are responsible not only for all crimes 
committed in furtherance of the enter- 
prise but also for all crimes that were 
natural or foreseeable consequences of 
the enterprise, even if these other 
crimes are incidental or unplanned. 
Consequently, even though there was 
not evidence to suggest that most of the 
accused were aware of the rape crimes 
committed in Omarska camp, nonethe- 
less these crimes were clearly foresee- 
able, as the Trial Chamber emphasized: 
"it would be unrealistic and contrary to 
all rational logic to expect that none of 
the women held in Omarska, placed in 
circumstances rendering them especial- 
ly vulnerable, would be subjected to 
rape or other forms of sexual violence." 
The Trial Chamber recognized that 
war creates situations where average 
citizens get caught up in the violence 
or hatred, and people often commit 
crimes they would ordinarily never 
even have dreamed of committing. 
Nonetheless, the Chamber empha- 
sized, the presence of war or mass vio- 
lence cannot shield or excuse perpe- 
trators from prosecution if they know- 
ingly participate in or facilitate crimi- 
nal activity. 
The Trial Chamber heard evidence 
that each accused was present during 
specific instances of abuses committed 
in the camp, and it also heard evi- 
dence that some of the accused occa- 
sionally attempted to assist a few of the 
detainees. Ultimately however, the 
court concluded that each of the 
accused had participated in a signifi- 
cant way in the joint criminal enter- 
prise that functioned as Omarska 
camp, a camp where persecution of 
non-Serbs through various forms of 
physical, mental, and sexual violence 
was rampant. The accused who had 
not physically committed crimes had 
showed up for work everyday despite 
the daily murders, tortures, beatings, 
and other mistreatment and performed 
the tasks assigned to them efficiently, 
effectively, and without complaint. 
They had facilitated the commission of 
the crimes and allowed them to contin- 
ue with ease and without disruption. 
All five accused were convicted of per- 
secution as a crime against humanity 
for the assortment of evils committed 
in Omarska camp. 
As to the rape crime charges against 
Radic, the Trial Chamber was convinced 
that he was involved in "the sexual 
harassment, humiliation, and violation 
of women" in Omarska camp. Several 
witnesses testified to his raping, attempt- 
ing or threatening to rape, or groping 
them. The Trial Chamber found that the 
sexual violence constituted both rape 
and torture. The women suffered severe 
pain and suffering constituting torture, 
in part because the "fear was pervasive 
and the threat was always real that they 
could be subjected to sexual violence at 
the whim of Radic." Despite this find- 
ing, because the indictment failed to 
indicate whether the sexual violence 
committed by Radic was different from 
the rapes charged as part of the persecu- 
tion count they were deemed sub- 
sumed by the persecution count; thus 
he was not convicted of rape and tor- 
ture for these crimes as crimes against 
humanity. Radic was however convicted 
of torture as a war crime for the sexual 
violence he inflicted upon women in 
Omarska camp. 
Conclusion 
The Omarska  cam^ case can be 
used to demonstrate that even during 
armed conflict, one cannot turn a blind 
eye to blatant criminal activity; if you 
know crimes are being committed and 
you perform acts that facilitate the 
commission of the crimes, you can be 
held criminally responsible. It can also 
be used to show that women are par- 
ticularlv vulnerable when detained in 
facilities guarded by armed men of an 
opposing side, and that all necessary 
and reasonable measures must be 
taken to provide protections against 
sexual violence to such women. Any 
planned or foreseeable crimes, includ- 
ing rape crimes, committed during the 
course of a joint criminal endeavor 
cause liability to attach to participants 
in the enterprise. 
The degree of culpability, the 
amount of time spent in the camp, the 
position of the accused, and whether 
the men convicted physically perpe- 
trated crimes was taken into account in 
sentencing. For the roles they played in 
facilitating or committing the crimes, 
Kvocka, Prcac, and Kos were given 
five- to seven-year prison terms; Radic 
received twenty years, and Zigic was 
sentenced to twenty-five years' impris- 
onment. This case is currently on 
appeal before the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber. 
Kelly D. Askin is director of the Interna- 
tional Criminallustice Institute, has pub- 
lished extensively in various areas of 
international law and justice initiatives, 
and served as a legal adviser-consultant 
for many war crimes proceedings. 
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